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EAST TEXAS HISTORICAL JOURNAL
The Insurance Debacle of 1956: Why Depositors 
Cheered for Albert Benton Shoemake’s Attempted Suicide
By Alexander J. Dodd
1956 was expected to be a year of general prosperity in the 
state of Texas.1 A five-year drought, the longest of Texas’ history to 
that point, lasted from 1950-1955, ended and allowed businesses 
to move forward toward economic stability.2 The Texas Almanac 
of 1955-1956 claimed that, even during the drought, Texas had 
“years of record attainment in building, industrial employment, 
merchandise sales and general commercial activity.”3 Texas ap­
peared to benefit from the emerging prosperity and the hard work 
of Texans through the drought. However, one key event showed 
how businesses, specifically Texas insurance agencies, were less 
secure than what was reported in the news or listed in the Alma­
nac and how this impacted the perceived dependability of these 
companies promoted in local advertisements. This research exam­
ines the suicide attempt of Albert Benton Shoemake, President of 
the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co., which broke new ground in the 
developing foundation of insurance dealings in East Texas. Share­
holders and families relying on Texas insurance worried about 
trust, loyalty, and dependability. The fall of Shoemake’s companies 
exposed crooked administrative practices and his suicide attempt 
brought it into the spotlight. To understand how this case affected 
Texas insurance companies, and the people who invested in them, 
this research will include primary accounts from sources such as 
Huntsville and Walker County records, the Houston Chronicle, the 
Huntsville Item, and the Austin Statesman. This research begins 
with an article published in the Huntsville Item in 1956.
Alexander J. Dodd is a graduate student at Sam Houston State 
University
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Local newspapers in 1956 were loaded with advertisements 
from local banks and insurance agencies promising dependability 
and an obligation to ethical practice. These, of course, were written 
on the horizon of what would be the second largest insurance disas­
ter in all of Texas history. On January 5, 1956, the Item published 
an article entitled “Progress in 1955.”4 This short article sets the 
stage for local Huntsville banks and their eventual fight against the 
distrust of the people toward big business. The article states that 
the year of 1956 promises growth after a long drought in 1955. 
Walker County relied on each person to use their opportunities to 
“make Huntsville the golden spot of East Texas and the nearby 
Gulf Coast area.”5 This advertisement sought to promote together­
ness among the people, then introduce their services into the midst 
of this feel-good promise. The article ends with a simple statement 
referring to Texas business: “We can make it whatever we want 
it to be- come what may!”6 In fact, located in the article directly 
below was another short titled: “State Capitol News.”7 The arti­
cle reports Drew Pearson’s proposed involvement with U.S. Trust 
and Guaranty Co., how the Senate began hearings investigating the 
company, other insurance companies owned by Shoemake were set 
under investigation, and land suits were filed with talk of insurance 
manipulations. The end of the article promises a great year for big 
business in Texas. Though they exerted great effort, scandal was 
coming to a head in East Texas.
On June 24, 1955, the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. was put 
under a temporary restraining order after refusing to disclose its 
failure to keep proper accounts, falsifying accounts, and from un­
authorized investments made by the company to the general pub­
lic.8 The state insurance commission issued the restraining order 
and the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. faced a receivership hearing 
in Austin.9 Shoemake attempted to recruit members of the state 
senate, with two successful hires: They were Carlos Ashley and 
Jep Fuller.10 Those who accepted and worked for the U.S. Trust and 
Guaranty Co. were under suspicion due to the recent allegations 
connected to their business dealings with Shoemake. Ashley acted 
on Shoemake’s behalf as his attorney and Fuller also provided help
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to Shoemake through his law firm and represented Shoemake’s 
company in several individual cases.11 The hiring of senators was 
no accident. Shoemake surrounded himself with prominent actors 
with political prowess to act as a buffer between himself and prying 
investigators.
State senators gathered an investigation committee and named 
State Auditor, C.H. Cavness to keep records of the U.S. Trust and 
Guaranty Co. and all its affiliates.12 Cavness was asked to prepare 
a summary of expenditures of the company for 1954 and 1955 and 
include legal fees, public relations and advertising expenditures, 
and the names of persons to whom they were paid.13 Shoemake’s 
companies had already shown signs of corruption prior to the 
charges. Renne Allred, an attorney for the receiver of Texas Insol­
vent Insurance Company,14 charged the investigating committee; 
claiming that the company evidenced insolvency earlier in 1955.15 
While Allred’s statement is true, the combination of other suspi­
cious companies under Shoemake’s authority and the 128,000 in­
vestors effected by his company’s insolvency created a dire need to 
retrieve money.16 Attorney General John Ben Shepperd estimated 
that investors would only receive around 15 cents for every dollar 
invested.17 McLennan County District Attorney, Tom Moore, stated 
that a grand jury would be empaneled in Waco on January, but was 
unsure whether they would hear the case against the U.S. Trust and 
Guaranty Co.18
Other insurance companies with relationships to Shoemake’s 
U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. were also under investigation by the 
Insurance Commission.19 These companies were ordered to show 
cause to prove why their licenses should not be revoked.20 These 
insurance companies included the All American Home Lloyds, 
the U.S. Life Insurance Co., Southern Medical and Hospital Ser­
vices of Waco, and American Atlas Life Insurance Co. of Dallas.21 
The All American Home Lloyds company was shut down after it 
was proven insolvent, owing around $235,217.00.22 Some insur­
ance companies, such as the U.S. Life Insurance Co. and Southern 
Medical and Hospital Services of Waco, were affiliated with other 
companies: the U.S. Trust and Dallas Fire and Casualty Co.23 The
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entanglement of these companies would prove fatal for the con­
tinuation of the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. Six other firms be­
longing to Shoemake were in danger of becoming insolvent. While 
these companies were being investigated, Shoemake was under 
close watch as the head of all six companies.
Shoemake’s home was searched during a raid led by Byron 
Lockhart, the attorney for the liquidation division of the Texas in­
surance commission.24 The search was ordered by District Judge 
Charles O. Betts, who earlier shut down the 11 firms of the U.S. 
Trust and Guaranty Co. in Texas.25 Shoemake claimed that he had 
stashed unaccounted company funds in the amount of $98,942.67 
into his account.26 An article in the Austin Statesman claims that 
Shoemake “co-operated in full with the surprise inventory.”27 Even 
if the money was recovered, it would be nothing compared to the 
supposed $7,000,000 lost by Shoemake’s company.28
In Waco, January 7, 1956, A.B. Shoemake attempted suicide 
using a .380 Colt automatic.29 Shoemake was discovered by his 
neighbor, Joseph W. Barnes, in his home covered in blood.30 Barnes 
was called by Mrs. Shoemake after Mr. Shoemake missed a previ­
ously planned dinner date with Mrs. Hoffman, Mrs. Shoemake’s 
sister.31 Barnes went to the side door calling out for his friend, 
when Shoemake opened the door, bloody and incoherent.32 Barnes 
rushed him to the bathroom to get him cleaned up, then returned 
to the phone where Mrs. Shoemake was still awaiting news about 
her husband.33 Barnes told her to come quickly and contacted Dr. 
Boyd Alexander, the Shoemake’s family physician to the scene.34 
Dr. Boyd put bandages on Mr. Shoemake as Mrs. Shoemake con­
tacted an ambulance.35 When the ambulance arrived, they found 
Shoemake badly wounded with blood already leaking through both 
sides of the bandages and sitting slumped in a chair in the side 
room of his home.36
Shoemake was rushed to Hillcrest Memorial Hospital, where 
he was provided glucose, plasma, and other treatments to offset 
potential shock.37 Dr. Alexander reported to The Austin Ameri­
can, that “He will probably live until Sunday morning.”38 Dr. Au­
brey Goodman, quite optimistically claimed, “He may live, but
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I wouldn’t write any life insurance on it.”39 Things looked bleak 
for Shoemake in the wake of his suicide attempt. On Monday of 
the following week, Shoemake was declared a dying man, with no 
hope for survival.40 He was given approximately 15 hours to live.41 
Shoemake’s suicide attempt created another problem. His life was 
insured through two policies in the amount of $1,000,000.42 In the 
event of Shoemake’s death, the beneficiary of the insurance poli­
cy was the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co., which was in temporary 
receivership.43 The creditors, therefore, would be the recipients of 
his life insurance money in accordance with what they were due. 
According to a Houston Chronicle article, some life insurance poli­
cies are voided in the event of a suicide.44 However, in Shoemake’s 
case, with his policy it was difficult to determine whether they 
would be voided or not.45 The deciding factor rested with Shoe­
make and his survival.
The fraudulent nature of Shoemake’s business dealings baffled 
government officials such as State Dist. Judge Charles O. Betts, 
who said that it was “the most amazing, fraudulent thing it has ever 
been my misfortune to look at.”46 Others surely agreed with Judge 
Betts’ opinion. A meeting of depositors from seven cities flocked 
to San Jacinto high school, where they were planning to discuss a 
statewide organization.47 Ironically, the news of Shoemake’s hospi­
talization was revealed to investors in Shoemake’s own company, 
who displayed a mixed reaction of groans, clapping, and cheers.48 
State Senator, Jimmy Phillips, commented on the ordeal, saying 
“anyone who would try to use your misfortune as a political ve­
hicle would in my mind be as guilty of callous indifference to the 
people’s welfare as those who are responsible for this situation.”49 
However, Phillips himself used the opportunity to promise the in­
vestors a secure repayment of their funds as he campaigned for 
governorship.50 He told them that his number one objective was to 
“regain all or part of their life savings.”51
The Texas Insurance Commission was experiencing its own 
difficulties amid the debacle sparked by Shoemake. Ralph Yarbor­
ough, an Austin attorney and gubernatorial candidate, during the 
same meeting of depositors, called for the resignation of all three
130
Vol. 57 Fall 2019 N um ber 2
members of the Texas Insurance Commission.52 The commission 
was under criticism for holding closed sessions. Senator Searcy 
Bracewell of Houston, was replaced by Senator William S. Fly, 
after Bracewell quit in protest of those closed sessions.53 Renne 
Allred made a series of charges against the commission for bribery 
and graft, for which he claimed he could provide evidence.54 He 
also accused them of negligence. Similarly, Yarborough claimed 
that the insurance commission delayed in acting against the U.S. 
Trust and Guaranty Co. that the commission demonstrated a “friv­
olous conception of its responsibilities.”55 The structure of the in­
surance commission was changing. Yarborough said that “They’ve 
just turned the horses around and hitched them up again with their 
tails toward the front and their heads up against the dashboard.”56 
An ineffective commission boded fruitless consequences in the 
case against the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.
The situation was exacerbated further when a group of credi­
tors from Waco boycotted a meeting held by depositors who sought 
to replace the previous Texas insurance commission.57 The boycott 
was in response to what attorney John L. Bates called a “meeting of 
political speakers.”58 The resultant legal resolution was a statewide 
audit of all Texas insurance companies. To prevent collusion, no 
auditor was assigned to check a company of former employment or 
one in which they owned stock. There was also a second resolution 
that objected to state legislators from being employed by insurance 
companies and objected to members of the State Insurance Com­
mission accepting favors or taking trips provided by various insur­
ance companies. These resolutions were a step in the right direc­
tion. However, it was discovered, or claimed, that the commission 
was not fully supportive of their own resolutions. Instead, their 
resolutions were acting as appeasements and used to rally support 
under their seemingly strong enforcement of ethical practice.
The $7,000,000 debt that was claimed against the U.S. Trust 
and Guaranty Co. was also in dispute, as John L. Bates reported in 
an article in The Houston Chronicle,59 Bates stated that he coordi­
nated a detailed investigation into the firm’s financial history. He 
said that the total loss of the firm should not amount to more than
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$1,200,000, and possibly much less than that. Bates also claimed 
that he would seek a declaratory statement, giving the depositors 
of the firm preferred treatment from the state receiver. Depositors 
organized themselves as the Preferred Depositors Assn, of Texas 
to enforce their entitlement to first preference on the assets of the 
U.S. Trust & Guaranty Co. and that an attorney and auditor will 
be hired as necessary to see that all such assets “be marshaled for 
our benefit.”60 The organization of these depositors created a new 
body of individuals who could now coordinate distribution of as­
sets through the receiver-liquidator and enforcement of criminal 
and civil pursuits. The Preferred Depositors Association of Texas 
formed when the Texas Insurance Commission failed to coordinate 
and perform their duties responsibly. Yarborough’s comment, that 
“The commission for some time has not merited the confidence of 
the people of Texas or the insurance industry of the state,” was part 
of the feeling and motivational force that led to the development of 
this new organization.61
Governor Allan Shivers, who was present at the meeting of 
depositors, said that the creditors did not need to organize and that 
the state receiver and the courts could handle the insurance situa­
tion without interference. He also claimed that certain politicians 
were using this problem to their own advantage to gain votes. An 
Austin American Statesman article adds, “He made it clear indi­
rectly, that he was referring to Yarborough.”62 It is important to 
note that, in 1956, governor Shivers had already been a large part 
of the economic backbone in Texas for seven years prior.63 Before 
being elected governor, Shivers ran and was elected as lieutenant 
governor in 1946. In the Texas Politics Project, he is remembered 
as having “helped bring Texas into the twentieth century.”64 After 
becoming governor in 1949, Shivers replaced long-time partner 
and former governor Beauford H. Jester, who died on July 11 of 
that same year. Shivers acted quickly, establishing the Legislative 
Council and the Legislative Budget Board. During the last years of 
his governorship, Shivers’ popularity began to decline. His politi­
cal standing on Eisenhower and his opposition to Brown v. Board 
o f Education were responsible for his loss of popularity in the eyes
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of Texans. What really ended his career as a politician was the cor­
ruption of his administration “because of state scandals involving 
insurance and veterans’ lands.”65 Shiver’s push for his own admin­
istration to take control of the insurance scandals removes doubt of 
this accusation. His deference to Yarborough also shows how his 
fear bubbled up, that the scandals were not new; but were a result 
of a preeminent system of corruption.
Ralph Yarborough was a political activist who became pop­
ular among voters in Texas in the 50s.66 Yarborough was elected 
to the United States Senate in 1957. Shivers retired from politics 
in 1957.67 The state was not only going through a small insurance 
scandal, but was also experiencing an important turn from conser­
vative to liberal and what became known as “Yarborough-Demo- 
crats.” Yarborough’s “grass-roots” ability to stimulate people and 
rally voters is a large part of what gave his campaign for reform of 
the insurance commission its value. State Representative Tom Jo­
seph of Waco reminds us not to become carried away in the words 
of Yarborough; The meeting “may be a political football for others 
but not for me. I’m sticking to the cold facts.”68 At this point, there 
was no way to be certain who was guilty, and for what crime. A 
necessity for answers kept the investigation going.
Opinions soon began to come up from the investigation. Tom 
Moore, District Attorney of Waco, believed that Shoemake was 
solely responsible for the fiasco associated with the U.S. Trust and 
Guaranty Co.69 He said, “It is my opinion now that the whole thing 
was a one-man operation.”70 Reports from the auditor showed that 
several insurance companies were going into receivership because 
of their failure to cooperate and release their records.71 The possi­
bility of finding evidence for the corruption of Shoemake’s compa­
ny was slim, especially considering what is known about governor 
Shivers and the corruption of his administration.
The incestuous interrelationships between various companies 
created a scenario of panic and mistrust. For example, Shoemake’s 
home was mortgaged with the title held by another one of his com­
panies: the U.S. Automotive Services.72 There is evidence which 
suggests that Shoemake played the lead role in the fraudulent
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practices of his firms. An article from The Austin Statesman says 
that witnesses in the past month, during various investigations of 
Shoemake’s firms, “had testified that Shoemake ruled the firm with 
an iron hand,” and that “he was the only person who knew the intri­
cate operations that were carried out. ” 73 No other person, except for 
Shoemake, knew how the companies operated according to witness­
es and demonstrated by the lack of knowledge on the part of the Tex­
as Insurance Commission. The answers laid in a new hospital bed.
Shoemake was transferred from Hillcrest Memorial Hospital 
in Waco to a veterans administration hospital because he had no 
money to pay his medical bills. 74 He was showing signs of increas­
ing health. Dr. Boyd Alexander, Shoemake’s family physician from 
Waco, said that Shoemake was in good shape and able to recognize 
his wife, swallow food and water, and nod his head to answer ques­
tions. 75 Investigators waited anxiously for Shoemake’s recovery. 
With Shoemake’s unique knowledge of his company’s processes he 
could provide information privy only to himself. The State Senate 
and House investigating committees used new tactics while they 
waited eagerly for the recovery of Shoemake.
A large investigation conducted by the Senate and House in­
vestigating committees was set out to check functions of the Insur­
ance Commission, study circumstances surrounding operation and 
collapse of the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co., determine if remedial 
legislation is needed, and investigate lobbying practices.76 All four 
of these items are discussed in this research. The information gath­
ered by later articles in newspapers such as the Huntsville Item, 
show how chaotic the situation became through increased specula­
tion in preparation for the findings of the official investigation. The 
first sentence of an article titled “State Capitol News”, describes 
accusations and their denials about details regarding the operation 
of the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. and other organizations. Talk of 
scandals involving politicians became evermore pronounced and 
public. The previous situation in which Shoemake offered certain 
political figures employment now seemed a small ordeal compared 
to the accusations being thrown about in the month following 
Shoemake’s attempted suicide.
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Again, the Insurance Commission received criticism when 
Renne Allred claimed that the commission received evidence of 
fraudulent activity from a report regarding the U.S. Trust and Guar­
anty Co.77 Though Allred is correct,78 it may not be fair to criticize 
the commission in this way and assume that they were completely 
aware of fraud. However, it is also reported that the U.S. Trust and 
Guaranty Co. “operated without a license from May 31, 1955, until 
put into receivership Dec. 12.”79 Even this statement is subject to 
debate because, according to Paul Connor, an attorney for the In­
surance Commission, all licenses for insurance companies expire 
on May 31 and companies are allowed to continue for a time un­
til they acquire a new license.80 The Insurance Commission began 
to work on new policies which would require Texas companies to 
prove their solvency by May 31 or lose their licenses, and require 
insurance companies to publish financial reports.81 The House and 
Senate committee chairmen expressed their eagerness to question 
Shoemake, as the political realm offered no true insight into the 
real dealings of the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.82
Two auditors were selected to conduct independent audits of 
the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.83 The two men were Felix Einsohn 
and Charles K. Leslie. Einsohn was a certified public account from 
Dallas and Leslie was an independent consulting actuary. The two 
auditors would investigate the firm to return lost investments to 
their respective investors. One such company, the Fidelity Trust 
and Guaranty Co. of Temple, collected more than $1,000,000 in au­
tomobile notes from the defunct U.S. Automotive Service, another 
company run under the authority of Shoemake.84 The companies 
affiliated with Shoemake’s U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. were al­
ready suspected of fraudulent activity. The problem facing inves­
tigators was how they were involved and what happened with the 
reported $1,000,000 owed by the defunct insurance company.
Even without Shoemake’s testimony, investigators began to 
piece together traces of suspicious activity between Shoemake’s 
companies and other actors. Shoemake’s heavy handed manage­
rial tendencies would catch up with him when Leslie, one of the 
auditors assigned to independently audit the U.S. Trust and Guar-
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anty Co., reported to the Senate investigating committee about his 
time spent under the employment of Shoemake as an accountant.85 
Shoemake’s insurance company, Campbell Builders Corporation, 
would later become the U.S. Automotive Service. Shoemake re­
tained Leslie in 1954 to assemble data for this company to per­
suade the Board of Insurance Commissioners of his legal practices. 
The report was successful, and Leslie was retained once again by 
Shoemake to process similar data for Shoemake’s Southern Guar­
anty Co. and the transfer of funds from it to the Campbell Builders 
Co. Leslie’s data and the companies seemed on par with the legal 
practices required of them. Leslie’s job would become more dif­
ficult, however, after being retained once again by Shoemake for 
records regarding the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.
The U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. was created out of a merg­
er between Shoemake’s U.S. Trust Company and his U.S. Trust 
and Guaranty.86 When retained by Shoemake in 1954, Leslie found 
that the records were “so inadequate that he withdrew.”87 Leslie 
claimed that the figures would have to be guesses, and that Shoe­
make would naturally be the best one to guess them.88 Inadequate 
records, seven different companies, and transferring funds between 
them was a recipe for disaster for Shoemake’s insurance empire. 
Leslie was the chief examiner of the Board of Commissioners in 
1954 and, upon seeing the inadequacy of Shoemake’s records and 
other companies, determined that the “whole setup” of Shoemake’s 
companies be examined, with property appraisals and new valua­
tions to make up for Shoemake’s own lack of data. So, from 1954 
to the end of 1955, these companies continued to work within their 
poorly structured system and eventually rack up an immense debt 
and lead a man to attempt suicide. It was revealed in Leslie’s re­
ports that Shoemake was not simply transferring money, but he 
was “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” as Leslie pictured it. Leslie found 
three loans from the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. to Campbell 
Builders Co. which were paid to fraudulently display a company 
in full solvency.
Another development came about in early February regarding 
the official records of Shoemake’s U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.
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Shoemake sent a confirmed 11 letters to Garland A. Smith, the 
former chairman of the Texas Board of Insurance Commissioners. 
Smith resigned after acquiring a stomach illness and was unable to 
provide the information. The investigation revealed that these let­
ters showed the weekly deposits and withdrawals of U.S. Trust and 
Guaranty Co. from Sept. 30 to Dec. 9, 1955.89 There were several 
documents missing, but from those provided an interesting pattern 
emerged and a new understanding of the case came about. Auditors 
testified that the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. was making consid­
erable profit from sales of certificates. Shoemake had not obtained 
a permit to sell certificates after the Securities Regulation Act, and 
the letters indicate that Smith was aware of the situation. Smith 
would later make an appearance in court before the McLennan 
County grand jury to testify against Shoemake and provide neces­
sary information about the case.
Arrangements were attempted to repay the people who had lost 
money by investing with the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co., as well 
as some of its other affiliates, which were all connected to Shoe­
make. A petition was filed by Representative Bert McDaniel of 
Waco, and former U.S. Trust attorney, to place priority of liquida­
tion of U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. payments on draft holders. The 
amount owed to the 5,600 draft holders was around $5,800,000.90 
If the petition went through, the draft holders would get their mon­
ey back. However, as has been shown, other organizations felt that 
priority of payments should be made to them in full. This could 
not possibly work with so many difficulties and the vast number of 
people negatively affected by Shoemake’s companies. The realities 
investigators faced in the liquidation of owed monies to clients 
of the former organizations included “unorthodox bookkeeping, 
annual statements, bolstered by borrowing, blown-up real estate 
values, and minutes of board meeting never held.”91 These factors 
made it seem impossible to pay full funds to all parties.
The liquidation process, set in motion by the Fidelity Trust and 
Guaranty Co., was headed by J.D. Wheeler.92 Wheeler claimed that 
first payments to U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. creditors could be 
expected about mid-July. New chairman for the Insurance Corn-
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mission, J. Byron Saunders, reported that the insurance problem 
was not completely resolved, but was on its way. The Insurance 
Commission would begin 4 initiatives to “clean-up” what was 
left of the debacle.93 These initiatives included: leave of absences 
granted to four examiners suspected of fraud, an order to certain 
insurance agencies to show cause lest their licenses be revoked, 
cut rates for insured crops, and announcing that all advertising of 
insurance securities be approved by the commission before they 
are published. Along with this, Saunders said that insurance com­
panies that passed a solvency test and get licenses after May 31 are 
“entitled to public confidence.”94
Almost one year later, on February 17, 1957, it was reported 
in the Austin American Statesman, that about $2,000,000 was now 
available to be paid to creditors who had lost money with the de­
mise of Shoemake’s company.95 Byron Lockhart, attorney for the 
receiver-liquidator, stated that liquidation of the assets was still in 
progress. The people were going to receive their money. In 1957, 
Shoemake continued to make slow progress at a veteran’s hospital 
in Waco, where he was transferred due to his inability to pay his 
hospital bill.96 It was reported by doctors that Shoemake was like a 
child. The gunshot wound to his head went through the part of his 
brain normally associated with lobotomies. Shoemake continued to 
receive medical treatment, but doctors made it clear that he would 
never fully recover from this wound. His motor skills were mak­
ing progress. The most significant part of Shoemake’s condition 
was his memory. Shoemake could no longer remember anything 
in clarity.
Initially, after he shot himself a year before, he could recall 
people and things, but he could not put together items into a context 
which made sense. He was reported to have been using a wheel­
chair and answering questions in short answers. He continued to 
outlive the expectations of doctors. Shoemake should not have 
survived to see January 8, 1956. His progress was so great that, 
in 1957, Shoemake was described by doctors to have the mental 
age of an 8-year-old.97 Full recovery was an impossibility accord­
ing to doctors at the veteran’s hospital. The progress of Shoemake,
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especially considering the injury, was nothing short of a miracle. 
Between 1956 and 1957, Shoemake’s progress caused Dr. Buck- 
holts to deem him capable of discharge, so long as Shoemake had 
a caretaker to receive him from the hospital. Unfortunately, for 
both Shoemake and his wife, Mrs. Shoemake became ill and was 
unable to receive Shoemake under her care. Dr. Buckholts was un­
able to provide Shoemake with a caretaker, so it was determined 
that Shoemake would stay at the hospital indefinitely.
Though sick and still recovering, Shoemake was not free of 
the consequences awaiting him for his actions before the attempted 
suicide. He was indicted in Waco on two counts of selling certified 
drafts without obtaining a permit from the state insurance board.98 
Tom Moore Jr., District Attorney, said that arraignment would be­
gin as soon as possible for Mr. Shoemake.99 Shoemake’s attorney, 
Representative Bert McDaniel, was planning to make an insani­
ty plea on behalf of Mr. Shoemake.100 McDaniel included that he 
would seek Shoemake’s commitment to the State Hospital for the 
Insane at Austin.101
Shoemake was never brought to trial.102 The receivership of the 
U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co. was formally closed June 6, 1963 by 
District Judge Charles O. Betts. Liquidation to people with claims 
against the company received only 40.31 cents on the dollar of 
their money back from their investments.103 The mortgage on the 
Shoemake home was not considered a homestead because it was 
mortgaged under the U.S. Trust and Guaranty Co.104 The mortgage 
was in the name of Shoemake’s brother-in-law, and was ready to 
be admitted as an asset in the liquidation process until Mrs. Shoe­
make filed a suit claiming that it was there homestead and could 
not be mortgaged. The case ended in a settlement. H.W. Hoffman, 
the brother-in-law whose name was on the mortgage, let the home 
fall into ruin.105 The Shoemake guest house caught fire in 1969. 
Weeds were growing all around the home.
As for the ongoing case, six other people were indicted who 
were suspected of fraudulent activities connected with Shoe­
make.106 They were Willis V. Lewis, Hugh Hope, James M. May, 
Willis E. Hutchearider, Marshall A. Fuglaar Sr., and Sylvester
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Loughlin. Their arraignment was expected in early September. 
Several charges were brought against them. All included years 
in prison and thousands of dollars in fines. Just as Shoemake had 
hired Leslie to present his company’s accounts, Shoemake also re­
tained several senators throughout 1955.107 These senators did not 
run again but were not indicted on charges either. The fall of Shoe- 
make’s company resulted in the second largest liquidation process 
in Texas state history.108
In 1955, it was claimed that 1956 would be a year for prog­
ress. Indeed, it was a year that saw exceptional progress in multiple 
arenas of Texas life; economically, socially, and politically. Or, at 
least, that’s how it was portrayed in various news articles and me­
dia. Different articles and different papers all reported conflicting 
numbers at some point. The $7,000,000 for example, was claimed 
by some to be only $1,000,000. By others it was claimed to be 
$2,000,000. There was no general factual consensus on numbers or 
exact details of Shoemake’s case. The memory of the fall of Shoe- 
make’s empire is, in the public sphere, nonexistent. In the political 
sphere it is an example of a man who failed at building a successful 
business. General prosperity was the implied sentiment, but con­
sidering the tragic destruction of a man’s companies, even under 
the shroud of a fraudulent mind, must show that there was more to 
1956 than a blissful general prosperity. In this instance, we see a 
man, whose last conscious words included: “the only thing I have 
done wrong is to try to build a business.”109 Shoemake’s attempted 
suicide exposed the public to the faulty administrative practices of 
insurance agencies in their time. In the end, it was Shoemake who 
had the bullet crash through his head, and others accused of fraud, 
or overlooked, who were paid or fired. Shoemake died at a veterans 
administration hospital, where he was kept for over 15 years after 
shooting himself.110 He died on April 30, 1972 at the age of 77 from 
heart complications. He is buried in San Saba Cemetery.
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